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This theoretical paper explores screening with loan collateral when both the 
collateral value and the probability of project success fluctuate. Some model 
versions challenge the classic findings of Bester (1985) by showing that high-risk 
borrowers may in such case be more willing to pledge collateral than low-risk 
borrowers. Abundant collateral then would not signal low risk. The results may 
help explain the mixed empirical findings on the role of collateral. The paper also 
extends the analysis of the topical subprime crises and risky real estate collateral. 
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Lainanhakijoiden erottelu lainamarkkinoilla 
vakuuksien arvon vaihdellessa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 19/2009 
Juha-Pekka Niinimäki 




Tässä keskustelualoitteessa tutkitaan lainanhakijoiden erottelua vakuuksien avulla 
(screening) tapauksessa, jossa sekä lainan takaisinmaksun todennäköisyyteen että 
lainan vakuuden tulevaan arvoon kohdistuu epävarmuutta. 
  Tutkimus kyseenalaistaa Besterin (1985) väitteet osoittamalla, että suuri-
riskiset lainanhakijat voivat olla vähäriskisiä halukkaampia antamaan lainalleen 
vakuuden. Näin ollen suuri vakuus ei osoita lainan olevan vähäriskinen. Tulokset 
auttavat ymmärtämään aikaisempien tilastollisten tutkimusten ristiriitaiset tulok-
set. Tutkimus täydentää tietämystä käynnissä olevasta subprime-kriisistä ja siihen 
liittyvästä kiinteistökuplasta. 
 
Avainsanat: pankit, vakuudet, lainanhakijoiden erottelu 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G21, G22, G28  
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Collateral plays a crucial role in lending. According to Blinks et al. (1993) and De 
Meza and Southey (1996) the ratio of collateral to loan exceeded unity for 85% of 
loans in Britain. Moreover, business startups and investment activity are strongly 
influenced by the supply and value of collateral (Black et al, 1996; Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989; Gan, 2009). Given the costs of collateral and its large and broad-
based impacts, it is vital to examine the role of collateral in detail. 
  The cornerstone of the theoretical research on collateral is the study of Bester 
(1985). Lenders screen borrowers by offering a menu of loan contracts. Low-risk 
borrowers choose secured loans at lower interest premiums, whereas high-risk 
borrowers prefer unsecured loans with larger premiums. Alternatively, borrowers 
may signal their types via collateral. In both scenarios, a high level of collateral is 
associated with low risk. 
  Bester’s (1985) visions have triggered abundant empirical research, but the 
findings are mixed. His visions are supported by the empirical findings of Jimenez 
et al (2006) and Berger et al (2007): low-risk borrowers pledge more collateral 
than high-risk borrowers. Cressy and Toivanen (2001) find no significant 
relationship between risk and collateral pledging. A few researchers find that 
high-risk loans are more secure than low-risk loans: eg Neuberger (2001) and 
Brick and Palia (2007). Consequently, the results are a bit conflicting. 
  This paper offers an explanation for the disagreement. In contrast to Bester 
(1985), our model reveals that in some cases a high-risk borrower may be more 
willing to pledge collateral than a low-risk borrower. As a result, the best secured 
loans may prove to be the most risky ones. The findings are based on the 
fluctuating value of collateral and fluctuating probability of project success. The 
findings may help to explain the mixed results of the empirical research and in 
this way suggest new ideas for research.  
  The type of the collateral proves to be important, and it is necessary to clarify 
the difference between costly collateral and non-costly collateral. Costly collateral 
entails costs to a borrower. If his project fails and yields no income for loan 
repayment, the borrower loses the collateral or a part of it. It is natural that outside 
collateral represents costly collateral. Yet, inside collateral may also be costly. 
Suppose an established firm finances a new project with a new bank loan. If the 
project fails, its value is zero. If the loan is collateralized by the old property of 
the firm, the failure of the project entails costs to owner of the firm. Non-costly 
collateral entails no cost to the borrower if he is unable to repay the loan. In sub-
prime lending, for example, banks granted mortgage loans without down 
payments. The purchase price of a house was funded with loan capital which was 
secured by the house. If the borrower was unable to repay the mortgage, the bank  
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was able to seize the house, but the borrower did not incur any costs, because he 
had not invested his personal funds. 
  The following findings are obtained when both the future value of collateral 
and the future probability of project success fluctuate. 
 
1.  The borrower’s expected cost from collateral decreases with the correlation 
between the value of collateral and the probability of project success. Suppose 
that they are strongly positively correlated. When the collateral value is high, 
the borrower’s project is likely to succeed and the expected cost from 
collateral is small. When a project is likely to fail, the collateral value is low 
and thus the borrower’s loss is small. Hence, the expected cost from collateral 
is smaller than the expected value of collateral. In contrast, if the probability 
of project success is negatively correlated with the collateral value, the 
expected cost from collateral exceeds the expected value of collateral, which 
is equal to the current value of collateral. 
2.  The bank’s expected collateral proceeds are negatively related to the 
borrower’s cost from collateral. If the collateral value and the probability of 
project success are negatively (positively) correlated, the bank’s expected 
proceeds from collateral are larger (smaller) than the current value of 
collateral. 
3.  A high-risk borrower may be more willing to pledge collateral than a low-risk 
borrower if: i) the value of his collateral is more highly correlated with the 
probability of project success than is the collateral of a low-risk borrower or 
ii) the variance in the high-risk type’s collateral value is sufficiently large 
compared to the collateral of the low-risk type. 
4.  The high-risk borrower’s expected costs from collateral may be zero even if 
the current value and the expected value of his collateral are clearly positive. 
5.  Non-costly collateral never entails costs to a borrower. Thus, it does not offer 
the same screening / signalling ability as costly collateral. A high amount of 
non-costly collateral does not signal low risk even when a lower amount of 
costly collateral may signal it. 
6.  Although non-costly collateral never entails cost to a borrower, it may 
generate income to him. If the collateral value appreciates above the loan 
repayment, the borrower can keep the surplus. A few subprime borrowers, for 
example, purchased houses without down payments in order to gamble with 
the appreciating value of real estate.
1 
 
Consequently, the findings depart somewhat from Bester (1985). A high-risk 
borrower’s expected cost from the same initial amount of collateral may be lower 
than for a low-risk borrower. A large amount of collateral does not signal low risk 
                                                 
1 For subprime lending, see Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006).  
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if the variance of the collateral value is large or if the collateral value is strongly 
correlated with the probability of project success, or if the collateral is non-costly. 
These findings may help explain the mixed results of the empirical research. 
  The paper is related to previous theoretical research on the role of collateral in 
lending: eg Bester (1985, 1987, 1994), Chan and Thakor (1987), Besanko and 
Thakor (1987a, 1987b), de Meza and Southey (1996), Coco (1999) and Chen 
(2006). For surveys on collateral, see Coco (2000) and Fulghieri and Goldman 
(2009). 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies costly collateral and 
Section 3 non-costly collateral. Section 4 gives evidence and examples. This 
material is presented after the models are set out, because the meaning of the 
evidence becomes clearer. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 Costly  collateral 
Consider a risk-neutral economy with entrepreneurs (borrowers) and banks. A 
bank is funded with deposits on which it pays interest at rate r. Two types of 
entrepreneurs exist, i = L,H, where L denotes a low-risk entrepreneur and H marks 
a high-risk one. Each entrepreneur can undertake an investment project which 
lasts for one period and requires one unit of investment input. If successful, with 
expected probability ti, a project produces output Yi, but if the project fails the 
output is zero. It is assumed that tL > tH, YL < YH, tLYL = tHYH > r. 
   The probability of project success is assumed to be stochastic and to depend 
on the future phase of the economy, which is unknown when the project is started. 
In prosperity (with probability g), the probability of success is high,  i i t t ≥ , but in 
depression, (with probability 1–g) the probability of success is lower,  i i t t ≤ . Here 
we have  i i i t t ) g 1 ( t g = − + . 
  A credit contract consists of loan interest rate, R, and collateral, C. 
Collateralization may entail transaction costs, which are assumed to be 
proportional to the amount of collateral at the factor k ≥ 0.
2 The future value of the 
collateral is stochastic. With probability h, the collateral value appreciates during 
the loan period and it is  C α  units at the end of the period. With probability 1–h, 
the collateral value depreciates to  C α ,  α < < α 1 . Collateral is priced correctly, 
with current value equal to expected value:  C ) h 1 ( C h C α − + α = . If a project 
fails, the bank can seize the collateral. The following assumption is made. 
 
                                                 
2 In this paper, either the positive transaction cost or the availability of collateral will reduce the 
use of collateral.  
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Assumption 1. The bank’s income from collateral is, at maximum equivalent to 
the promised loan repayment. 
 
Thus, a bank cannot benefit from a project failure. The correlation between 
collateral value and the probability of success is 
 
h / g ) h 1 )( g 1 (





The borrower’s expected return on a loan contact (loan interest rate, collateral 
combination) is 
 
kC )) R , C ( Min ) t 1 ( ) R Y ( t ( )) h 1 t ( P 1 )( h 1 (
)) R , C ( Min ) t 1 ( ) R Y ( t ( ) h 1 t ( P ) h 1 (
)) R , C ( Min ) t 1 ( ) R Y ( t )( ) h t ( P 1 ( h
)) R , C ( Min ) t 1 ( ) R Y ( t )( h t ( hP
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The R.H.S consists of four lines, which represent the borrower’s return in the four 
phases of the world: 1) collateral value is high together with high probability of 
loan success, 2) collateral value is high but the probability of loan success is low, 
3) collateral value is low but the probability of success is high, 4) Both factors are 
low. The last term indicates the transaction cost of collateral. Besides,  ) h t ( P i  
denotes the probability of loan success when the collateral value is high, and 
) h 1 t ( P i −  is the probability of success when the collateral value is low. Since the 
economy booms with probability g we must have 
 
g ) h 1 t ( P ) h 1 ( ) h t ( hP i i = − − +  (2.3) 
 
In addition, the probabilities in (2.2) must satisfy 
 
[] [] i i i i i i i i i t ) h 1 t ( P 1 ) h 1 ( t ) h 1 t ( P ) h 1 ( t ) h t ( P 1 h t ) h t ( hP t − − − + − − + − + =  (2.4) 
 
Some manipulation gives 
 





) t t )( h 1 (
) t t )( h t ( hP t t
) h 1 t ( P
i i
i i i i i
i − −
− − −
= −  (2.6) 
 
which is utilized in the proofs. Obviously, the entrepreneur’s expected profit in 
(2.2) must be positive or zero. The profit can be restated as 
 
[]
[] kC C ) t 1 ( ) h 1 t ( P 1 ) h 1 ( C ) t 1 )( h 1 t ( P ) h 1 (
) R , C ( Min ) t 1 ( ) h t ( P 1 h ) R , C ( Min ) t 1 )( h t ( hP ) R Y ( t
i i i i
i i i i i
− α − − − − − α − − − −
α − − − α − − −
 (2.7) 
 
Two cases appear depending on the appreciated value of loan collateral. 
 
 
2.1 Case  C ) R , C ( Min α = α  
The appreciated value of collateral does not cover the loan interest payment and 
(2.7) simplifies to 
 
kC C ) t t )( h 1 t ( P ) h 1 (
C ) t 1 )( h 1 ( C ) t t )( h t ( hP C ) t 1 ( h ) R Y ( t
i i i
i i i i i i
− α − − − +
α − − − α − + α − − −
 (2.8) 
 
Inserting  ) h 1 n ( P B −  from (2.6) into this implies 
 
[]
kC C ) )( t t )( h t ( hP
C ) t 1 ( h 1 t C ) t 1 ( h ) R Y ( t
i i i
i i i i
− α − α − +
α − + − + α − − −
 (2.9) 
 
Under the fixed level of profit, it is possible to calculate the entrepreneur’s 
marginal rate of substitution between loan interest rate and collateral 
 
i
i i i i i i
t
k ) )( t t )( h t ( hP ) t t ( t 1
dC
dR + α − α − − α − − −
− =  (2.10) 
 
The marginal rate of substitution gives the required reduction in loan interest rate 
when the amount of collateral increases by one unit. In Bester (1985), where the 




                                                 





k t 1 + −
−  (2.11) 
 
It is easy to see that in Bester (1985) a low-risk borrower is more willing to pledge 
collateral than a high-risk borrower. This makes it possible to screen borrowers 
via collateral. In equilibrium, a bank offers two contracts to borrowers. Low-risk 
borrowers optimally self-select a contract with low loan interest rate and a 
positive amount of collateral, whereas high-risk borrowers prefer a contract with 
higher loan interest but no collateral. In our model, the following result can be 
seen from (2.10). 
 
Proposition 1. The marginal rate of substitution is increasing in  ) h t ( P i . 
 
Intuitively, when  ) h t ( P i  is large, the fluctuations are highly positively correlated. 
When the collateral value is high, the probability of success is high and thus the 
borrower’s expected collateral losses are modest. The borrower is likely to lose 
collateral if the collateral value is low. Again, the borrower’s expected costs from 
collateral are modest and therefore his marginal rate of substitution is high. A 
borrower is willing to pledge a lot of additional collateral if the loan interest rate 
declines a bit, because his expected costs from collateral are modest. The opposite 
holds if  ) h t ( P i  is low. 
 
Proposition 2. The marginal rate of substitution is the same as in Bester (1985) if 
  i)  Only the probability of success fluctuates or 
  ii)  Only the collateral value fluctuates or 
  iii)  Both fluctuate independently 
 
Proof: To show the first result, assume  1 = α = α . Inserting this into (2.10) gives 




i i i i i i
t
k ) )( t t )( h t ( hP ) 1 )( t t ( g t 1
dC
dR + α − α − − α − − + −
− =  (2.12) 
 
Since  ) ( h 1 α − α = α −  it is possible to restate this as 
 
i
i i i i
t
k ) )( t t ( h )) h t ( P g ( t 1
dC
dR + α − α − − + −
− =  (2.13) 
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When the fluctuations are independent,  ) h t ( P g i = , which simplifies to (2.11). 
Q.E.D 
 
Thus, the model includes many cases with the same marginal rate of substitution 
as in Bester (1985). A comparison follows 
 
Corollary 1. If the probability of loan success and the collateral value are 
positively (negatively) correlated, the marginal rate of substitution is higher 
(lower) than in Bester (1985). With the given loan interest rate and amount of 
collateral, the borrower’s returns are increasing and the bank returns are 
decreasing in  ) h t ( P i . 
 
Proof: The first part of the corollary is based on Proposition 1, Proposition 2iii, 
and (2.1). For the second part, recall the borrower’s returns from (2.9), and note 
that they are increasing in  ) h t ( P i . Alternatively, the borrower’s returns can be 
restated as  B i i Y t π − = π , where  B π  denotes the bank’s expected returns (loan 
interest income and collateral) from a financed project. Since the borrower’s 
returns are increasing in  ) h t ( P i , the bank’s returns are decreasing in it. Q.E.D 
 
At first sight one might presume that the expected bank returns from collateral are 
equal to the expected value of collateral, which is equal to the current value of 
collateral. Corollary 1 shows that this is not true. The correlation between 
collateral value and probability of loan success has a crucial influence on the 
bank’s expected collateral proceeds as well as on the borrower’s expected costs 
from collateral. 
 
Proposition 3. If  1 ) h t ( P i = ,  0 = α ,  1 ti =  the borrower’s expected costs from 
collateral are equal to the transaction costs of collateralization, –kC, and the 
marginal rate of substitution is –k/ti. The borrower never loses the collateral. 
 
Proof: This is easy to see from (2.9) and (2.10). Note that when  0 = α , we have 
1 h = α  .Q.E.D 
 
A project is always successful when the collateral value is high. It fails with a 
positive probability, but only when the collateral value is zero. Hence, the 
expected costs from collateral amount to the initial transaction cost. If this is zero, 
collateral entails no costs to high-risk borrowers, even when the initial amount of 
collateral and its expected value are high.  
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Corollary 2. Suppose that a high-risk borrower has more collateral than a low-
risk borrower, the value of the low-risk type’s collateral is non-stochastic, and the 
value of the high-risk type’s collateral is stochastic. Then, the expected costs from 
collateral may be higher for the low-risk type. 
 
Proof: Suppose k  =  0. Given (2.11) or Proposition 2, we have 
L L t / ) k t 1 ( dC / dR + − − =  for the low-risk type. Suppose that the project and 
collateral of the high-risk type satisfy  1 ) h t ( P H = ,  0 = α ,  1 tH = . Given 
Proposition 2, his costs from collateral are dR/dC = 0. Q.E.D 
 
The intuition is the same as above. The result is interesting, because it departs 
from Bester (1985). When k is sufficiently small, a high-risk borrower is more 
willing to pledge collateral than a low-risk one. Yet, the types of the collateral are 
different. It is, however, possible to derive a stronger result. In the following, 
borrowers have the same kind of collateral. Again, collateral is more costly for a 
low-risk borrower. 
 
Corollary 3. Suppose that a high-risk borrower pledges more collateral than a 
low-risk borrower, the type of collateral is the same and that its value is 
stochastic. It is possible, that the expected costs from collateral are higher for the 
low-risk type, because its collateral is less correlated with the probability of 
project success. 
 
Proof: Suppose that k,  0 = α ,  1 tH = . Suppose that, for the low-risk type, 
g ) h t ( P L =  (collateral and the probability of project success are independent) and, 
for the high-risk borrower,  1 ) h t ( P H = . Obviously, for the high-risk borrower, the 
expected cost from collateral is zero (Proposition 3), but for the low-risk borrower 
it is the same as in Bester (1985) (Proposition 2). Therefore, the cost is higher for 
the low-risk borrower when k is sufficiently small Q.E.D 
 
Corollary 4. Suppose that the NPV of a high-risk project is negative. It is possible 
that a rational borrower is willing to pledge full collateral for the project and bears 
no cost from the collateral. Thus, full collateralization does not screen from the 
loan market projects with negative NPV. 
 
Suppose:  0 k = ,  2
1 g h = = ,  0 = α ,  2 = α ,  1 tH = ,  0 tH = ,  1 ) h t ( P H = , r = 1.05, 
R = 1.1 = C,  Y = 2.  Then,  collateral  is  priced  correctly  ) 1 ( 2
1
2
1 = α + α , the 
expected probability of project success is 50%  ) t t ) g 1 ( t g ( H 2
1
H H = = − +  and the 
NPV of the project is negative  ) r Y t ( H < . Given proposition 3, the expected cost 
from collateral is zero. Q.E.D  
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In contrast to a standard theory with non-stochastic collateral, a borrower is 
willing to pledge full collateral for a project with negative NPV. 
  In sum, we have observed that the expected costs from collateral may be 
lower for the high-risk type, which makes screening and signaling impossible. 
The high-risk borrower’s expected costs from both collateral and loan interest are 
lower than for the low-risk borrower.
4 Obviously, there are no such loan contracts 
(collateral & loan interest rate combinations), which are correctly self-selected by 
entrepreneurs according to their true risk types. 
  Furthermore, when both collateral and loan interest payments yield lower 
expected costs to high-risk borrowers, raising the required amount of collateral 
could make the loan contract unprofitable to low-risk borrowers and so only the 
high-risk borrowers would apply for a loans. Hence, the collateral requirement 
could have negative effects on the average quality of the loan portfolio. 
  Interpreting a large amount of collateral to surely signal low risk or to screen 
high-risk borrowers from the loan contract may lead to erroneous conclusions by 
bankers or researchers. It is necessary to find out the variance and correlation 
between collateral value and probability of project success. 
  So far we have assumed that the type of collateral is given. Its variance and its 
correlation with the probability of loan success have been given. Alternatively, a 
borrower might be able to choose the type of collateral so that his expected returns 
are maximized:  ) h t ( P i  is as high as possible. Obviously, this would lower the 
bank’s expected returns (Corollary 1). Therefore, the bank must pay close 
attention to the type of collateral, its variance and correlation with the probability 
of project success. 
  In the following, it is assumed that the collateral type can be chosen by the 
bank, which seeks the optimal type of collateral. Above we found that in some 
cases screening / signalling is impossible. Next we shall illustrate an opposite-type 
case. It is possible to separate borrowers using collateral, which entails more costs 
for high-risk borrowers than for low-risk ones. The result is similar to standard 
models. Two alternative contracts are available. In the high-risk contract, the loan 
interest rate is high, because the loan is repaid with a low probability, but the 
required amount of collateral is zero. The low-risk contract includes a low interest 
rate, but the amount of collateral is positive. Although the risk types of borrowers 
are unobservable, their characteristics are assumed to be known. Mainly, the 
correlations between collateral and the probabilities of project success are known. 
This knowledge is utilized when the collateral type in chosen so that the costs of 
                                                 
4 The high-risk borrower’s expected costs from the loan interest are lower than for the low-risk 
borrower because the high-risk borrower pays the loan interest with lower probability. His costs 
from collateral are lower than the costs for the low-risk borrower if corollary 2 or 3 is satisfied.  
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screening are minimized. This is achieved when the amount of collateral is as 
small as possible. The following result is obtained. 
 
Proposition 4. Suppose that the type of collateral can be chosen. Then the optimal 
type of collateral is such that it minimizes (maximizes) the costs of the low-risk 
(high-risk) type:  ) h t ( P H  is small and  ) h t ( P L  is high. 
 
Proof: In equilibrium, a high-risk agent prefers his contract (loan interest rate RH, 
no collateral) to a low-risk contract (loan interest rate RL, collateral C) when it 
entails lower costs to him 
 
[]
kC C ) )( t t )( h t ( hP
C ) t 1 ( h 1 t C ) t 1 ( h R t R t
H H H
H H H L H H H
+ α − α − −
α − + − − α − + ≤
 (2.14) 
 
The L.H.S expresses the high-risk agent’s expected payments from his contract 
and the R.H.S his payments from the low-risk contract. The optimal level of 
collateral can be chosen from (2.14) 
 
* C
k ) )( t t )( h t ( hP ) t t ( g t 1
) R R ( t
H H H H H H
L H H =




This is increasing in  ) h t ( P H . The expected costs of the low-risk agent are 
 
* C ) k ) )( t t )( h t ( hP ) t t ( g t 1 ( R t L L L L L L L L + α − α − − α − − − +  (2.16) 
 
The costs are decreasing in  ) h t ( P L , but increasing in C*. As a result, the optimal 
type of collateral is such that  ) h t ( P L  is high, but  ) h t ( P H  is low. Q.E.D 
 
 
2.2 Case  R ) R , C ( Min = α  
In this section the appreciated value of collateral is so high that it exceeds the loan 
interest rate. As a result, when a project fails and the collateral value appreciates 
during the loan period, collateral covers the whole loan repayment. Thus, the bank 
does not bear a loan loss even if the project produces no output. In addition, the 
borrower can keep the surplus,  R C− α . Given (2.7), the borrower’s expected 
returns can now be restated as 
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kC C ) t 1 )( h 1 ( C )) t t )( h t ( hP t t (
R ) t 1 ( h R ) t t )( h t ( hP ) R Y ( t
i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
− α − − − α − − −
− − − + − = π
 (2.17) 
 
From this it is possible to solve for the marginal rate of substitution 
 
) t 1 ( h ) t t )( h t ( hP t
k ) t t )( h t ( hP )) t 1 ( h 1 t (
dC
dR
i i i i i
i i i i i
− + − −
− α − − α − + −
=  (2.18) 
 
Proposition 5. When  0 R C > − α , the marginal rate of substitution is always 
lower than in Bester (1985). The marginal ratio of substitution is zero if k,  0 = α . 
 
Proof: Note that (2.18) is negative and it is minimized when  1 ) h t ( P i = . Then, 
(2.18) gives 
 
) t 1 ( h t






− α − + α − −
=  (2.19) 
 
which is negative, but exceeds (2.11). The latter of Proposition 5 can be seen from 
(2.18). Q.E.D 
 
A borrower requires a smaller decrease in the loan interest rate than in Bester 
(1985), because he benefits from the low loan interest rate if his project succeeds 
and even if it fails, provided the collateral value is high (recall that the borrower 
can keep the surplus,  0 R C > − α ). Since he benefits from the low loan interest 
rate relatively often, he is willing to pledge more collateral even when the loan 
interest rate declines a bit. 
 
Proposition 6. Suppose  0 R C > − α . If  1 ) h t ( P i = ,  k 0 = = α ,  1 ti =  the 
borrower’s expected cost from collateral is zero. More commonly, the expected 
cost from collateral is decreasing in its variance. The marginal rate of substitution 
is also decreasing in variance.
5 
 














                                                 
5 The average value of collateral does not change due to the increased variance, 
hdα +(1–h)dα=0.  
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For the third result, we use (2.7) to restate the marginal rate of substitution as 
 
0
) t 1 ( h ) t t )( h t ( hP t
k ) t t )( h 1 t ( P ) h 1 t ( P ) h 1 ( ) t 1 )( h 1 (
C
R
i i i i i
i i i <
− + − −






Since  0 d / d < α α , we obtain  0 dCd / dR > α . Q.E.D 
 
The intuition of the first result is the same as in the context of Proposition 3. The 
project is always successful if the collateral value is high. When a project fails, the 
collateral value is zero. Hence, the borrower never loses the collateral and the 
costs of collateral consist of the initial transaction costs. Let us now turn to the 
second and the third result. Suppose that the variance increases and that the 
collateral value is high. The higher variance has no effect on the costs of 
collateral, because the collateral value is already at the upper limit (= loan interest 
rate). Suppose now that the collateral value is low. The increased variance pushes 
down the lower limit, α. Thus, the total effect is asymmetric and the increased 
variance erodes the costs from collateral. Put differently, when the collateral value 
appreciates, a borrower can keep the surplus,  R C− α . Obviously, the higher the 
variance, the higher the surplus of the borrower. The following corollary, which 
follows from Proposition 6, highlights this point. 
 
Corollary 5. Suppose that a low-risk borrower and a high-risk borrower pledge 
the same kind of collateral. For both borrower types, the probability of project 
success is independent of the collateral value. Although the high-risk borrower 
has more collateral, his expected costs from collateral may be lower than for the 
low-risk type, if the variance of the high-risk type’s collateral is higher than the 
variance of the low-risk type’s collateral. 
 
The loan collateral may, for example, consist of real estate. Suppose that a high-
risk borrower operates in an environment where the value of real estate fluctuates 
more widely than in the environment of the low-risk type. Then, even when the 
collateral value and the probability of project success are independent, and the 
high-risk borrower pledges more collateral than the low-risk one, the high-risk 
borrower’s expected costs from collateral may be lower than the costs of the low-




3 Non-costly  collateral 
So far we have investigated costly collateral, but in this section collateral entails 
no costs to borrowers because it is purchased with loan capital. It is natural that 
such collateral consists of inside collateral. Consider, for instance, a homebuyer 
with a subprime loan without a down payment. He borrowers a unit from a bank 
and purchases a house, which is pledged as collateral. If the borrower earns 
income for the loan repayment, he repays the loan and can keep the house. If he is 
unable to earn money, the bank can seize the collateral.
6 
  The same kind of loan, without down payment, has been used in commercial 
projects. Lamm and O’Keefe (1998a, p. 342) give an example from the S&L 
crisis: ‘These problems arose in part because the Massachusetts Miracle had lured 
novice developers – many with weak business plans often based on little or poor 
market research – into the real estate game. Some commercial projects were 100 
per cent financed and based on such unrealistic expectations as the continuation of 
10 per cent annual price hikes into the 1990s’. 
  This section explores screening with non-costly collateral. Suppose a firm 
with no capital of its own that seeks a bank loan. The loan size is 1 unit, and γ 
units of it is used to cover the out-of-pocket expenses of the project and the rest of 
the loan is spent on production facilities, eg factory area or office building, 
0 ≤ γ < 1. The production facilities represent loan collateral. The initial value of 
the collateral is, C = 1 – γ, but its value fluctuates during the loan period. At the 
end of the period, the collateral value is either  C α  units (with probability h) or 
C α  units (with probability   – h),  α < < α 1 . Again, the current value of the 
collateral is equal to its expected value. Banks fund loans by attracting deposits at 
the interest rate of the economy, r. 
  The economy has two types of firms (borrowers): low risk and high risk. With 
probability tL, a low-risk borrower can earn income YL, but with probability 1 – tL 
it earns nothing. A high-risk borrower is unable to earn income. It is assumed that 
0 t t H L = > ,  r Y t L L > . 
  Again, the expected probability of repayment is stochastic and its future value 
is unknown at the start of the period when the lending decision is made. With 
probability g, the economy later booms and the expected probability of success is 
relatively high,  i i t t ≥ . With probability  g 1− , the economy slumps and the 
probability of success is lower,  i i t t ≤ . Obviously, we have  i i i t t ) g 1 ( t g = − + . 
Now the firm’s expected returns are 
 
                                                 
6 For subprime mortgages with 100% loan finance, see Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 
(2006).  
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Note that (3.1) differs from (2.2) in an important way. In (2.2), collateral entails 
costs to a borrower if his project fails. Here collateral entails no cost. On the 
contrary, the value of the collateral may appreciate so strongly during the loan 
period that it exceeds the loan interest rate. Then, the borrower obtains positive 
returns from the project,  R C− α , even if the underlying project fails. Since C ≤ 1 
and R ≥ r > 1, it is known that  R C < α . Some manipulation yields 
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is the expected value of the production facilities for a successful firm. In (3.2) , we 
have three terms. The first one indicates the profits of a successful firm, and the 
second term shows the expected value of the production facilities of a successful 
firm. The last term expresses the profits when a project fails but collateral value 
appreciates. Two cases can occur.  
 
 
3.1 Max  C ) R , C ( α = α  
The appreciated value of collateral does not cover the loan repayment. Thus, only 
a low-risk type seeks a loan. A high-risk type does not seek for a loan, because his 
project fails with certainty and the appreciated value of collateral does not exceed 
the loan interest rate. 
  When a project fails, a loan defaults and the bank seizes the collateral. Thus, 
we do not directly see C in firm profits,  ) R Y ( t i i i − = π . In a competitive economy 
collateral has an indirect effect because it lowers the loan interest rate. Collateral 
cannot be used to screen borrowers, and it has no direct effect on their incentives 
to seek a loan. The screening effect, however, obtains even without collateral 
because the high-risk types cannot earn positive income. 
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3.2 Max  R ) R , C ( = α  
The appreciated value of collateral is now so high that it covers the loan 
repayment. The expected returns are given by (3.2). For the low-risk firm this is 
positive, and it will seek a loan. For a high risk type, we obtain 
 
) R C ( h − α  (3.4) 
 
This is positive, and a high-risk firm seeks a loan. Although it cannot operate 
successfully, the value of its production facilities – for example, real estate – may 
rise so rapidly during the lending period that the value exceeds the loan 
repayment. The high-risk borrower’s expected returns are positive. Both types 
seek a loan, and the problem of asymmetric information is present. If the 
proportion of high-risk borrowers is high, their existence can destroy the loan 
market: nobody receives a loan. 
 
Proposition 7. Suppose that  R > α . Then high-risk types seek loans, and the 
problem of asymmetric information is present only if the initial level of collateral 
is sufficiently high.  
 
Proof: The initial value of loan collateral is  γ − =1 C.  I f  γ = 0,  we  have 
0 R C > − α . High-risk types seek loans, and the problem of asymmetric 
information is present. Alternatively, suppose that γ approaches one, so that so 
that  0 ) 0 , R C ( Max = − α . Now high-risk types cannot gamble with collateral, and 
they do not seek loans. The problem of asymmetric information is avoided. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Non-costly collateral never causes losses to a borrower, but it may provide 
benefits. First, in the competitive economy collateral pushes down the loan 
interest rate, because unsuccessful loans yield income to banks. Secondly, if a 
borrower earns enough income for the loan repayment, he can keep the collateral. 
Thirdly, if the collateral value appreciates sufficiently during the loan period, the 
borrower obtains a positive return,  R C− α , even if his project fails. 
  The initial value of the collateral is given by the production process of the 
sector, and the variance of the collateral value is affected by the characteristics of 
the economy. These factors may make a project lucrative to borrowers who 
gamble on the future value of collateral. A firm may, for example, purchase an 
office building and not begin any business at all. If the value of the building 
appreciates sufficiently during the loan period, the firm can sell the office 
building, pay back the loan and make a handsome profit.  
22 
  Given Proposition 7, if the initial value of collateral is low, only low-risk 
types seek loans, but if the initial value of collateral is high, both types seek loans. 
Hence, a large initial amount of collateral does not signal a low risk. As a matter 
of fact, the case is totally the opposite.
7 
  With costly collateral, a different screening equilibrium is likely to occur: 
low-risk borrowers have secured loans, but the loans of high-risk types are 
without collateral (Bester, 1985). However, even low-risk borrowers may pledge 
less collateral than what both borrower types have in the pooling contract with 
non-costly collateral. Thus, the initial amount of collateral does not reveal the true 
borrower type. It is necessary to analyze whether collateral consists of costly or 
non-costly collateral. Non-costly collateral may provide good liquidation proceeds 
to a bank, if a borrower defaults. Yet, since collateral is funded with loan capital, 




4  Evidence and examples 
The results of the previous sections are based on the assumption of a stochastic 
value of collateral. In addition, the correlation between collateral value and 
probability of project success proves to be important. This section cites examples 
which show that the assumptions are realistic. Collateral values fluctuate widely 
and are often highly positively correlated with the probability of project success. 
  It is natural that an outside shock which reduces the probability of project 
success in a sector also reduces the values of production factors in the same 
sector. If collateral consists of production factors, the outside shock reduces the 
probability of project success and the collateral values. Lamm and O’Keefe 
(1998b) give the following example. In 1980s the fall of the oil price led to a 
banking crisis in the Southwest of USA. In 1973 the import price of crude oil was 
$2.75 per barrel, but the price rose gradually to $36.95 per barrel in April 1981. 
Numerous new oil wells, which could not operate profitably with oil prices below 
$15 a barrel, were established. Several banks, for example Penn Square, 
specialized in financing oil business. These loans were secured by the borrowers’ 
oil and gas reserves. Lenders were anticipating the price of oil to rise to $60 a 
barrel, but it slid to $10 per barrel, making numerous oil wells unprofitable. 
Lamm and O’Keefe (1998b, p. 325) report: ‘The energy loans in which Penn 
                                                 
7 We have simplified the analysis by assuming that the project of the high-risk borrower never 
succeeds. Alternatively, it is possible to assume that the project succeeds with a positive 
probability, but the project causes a participation cost. Then, it is possible that the high-risk 
borrower undertakes the project only if the collateral value can exceed the loan repayment. Again, 
the option to gamble with the future value of collateral makes the project profitable.  
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Square was so heavily invested had been based on extremely high oil and gas 
prices. When the energy markets deteriorated, a huge volume of loans defaulted 
and the value of the supporting collateral was minimized, leading to Penn 
Square’s failure’. Consequently, the drop in the oil price simultaneously 
devastated the borrowers’ earnings and the value of collateral, causing a surge of 
bank failures. 
  Furthermore, when collateral consists of production factors, the highest 
valuation potential buyers of collateral are likely to be other firms in the sector. 
The price of the collateral may fall below value in best use if many of the sector’s 
firms become insolvent due to the shock and the rest of the firms are also 
damaged by the shock. Then, the potential buyers also encounter severe financial 
difficulties, their ability to pay for the production factors of the failed firms is 
weak, and the price of the production factors (collateral) will be low (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1992).
8 
  Real estate and firms’ stocks represent the most common forms of collateral.
9 
The variance of their prices is high and the prices are usually positively correlated 
with the probability of project success. During the Asian crisis in the 1990s, for 
example, stock prices appreciated sharply during the boom phase: 405% in Hong-
Kong, 352% in Philippines, and over 155% in Malaysia. The depreciation was 
dramatic during the economic downturn: –56% in Hong-Kong in a year, –53% in 
Philippines in 18 months and –76% in Malaysia in 18 months. The collapse of 
stock prices was accompanied by a drop in the value of real estate collateral. In 
Hong-Kong, commercial real estate prices rose 100% from 1993 to 1997, but 
dropped back to the original level by the end of 1998 (Collyns and Senhadji, 
2002). As to the real estate, there are many examples of wide fluctuations. In 
Stockholm, inflation-adjusted real estate prices rose 450% in the 1980s. From 
1989 to 1993, inflation-adjusted prices depreciated below the 1982 level (Herring 
and Wachter, 1999). In Japan, commercial property prices rose by over 300% in 
the 1980s, but declined again to the initial level over the next 5 years (Hilbers et 
al, 2001). Consequently, there is abundant evidence that the prices of the most 
common types of collateral fluctuate widely and are positively correlated with 




                                                 
8 Schleifer and Vishny (1992, p. 1355) give the following example: ‘…when Eastern and Pan Am 
put their assets up for sale at time when other airlines were themselves losing money, the potential 
buyers could not borrow money as easily and assets appeared to be selling at ore “distressed 
prices”. For example, in December 1991 United bought bankrupt Pan Am’s Latin American routes 
for $135 million compared to the $215 million it had offered in late August and $342 million paid 
earlier to Eastern by American for similar routes.’ 
9 According to Borio (1996), the portion of loans secured by real estate is high: 59% in Great 
Britain, 56% in Canada and 66% in United States.  
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5 Conclusions 
This paper extends the classic study of Bester (1985). With full agreement on the 
importance of his contributions, it is shown that if his model framework is 
modified a bit (in a realistic way), it is possible to present cases in which the 
findings depart from Bester’s findings. 
 
1.  When both high-risk and low-risk borrowers pledge the same type of 
collateral and the variance of the collateral is the same, the expected costs 
from the collateral may be smaller for the high-risk type if the value of the 
collateral is more highly correlated with the success probability of his project 
than with the success probability of a low-risk project. 
 
2.  When both high-risk and low-risk borrowers pledge the same type of 
collateral and the collateral value is independent of the project success, the 
expected costs from the collateral may be smaller for a high-risk type, if he 
operates in an environment in which the variance of the collateral value is 
higher than in the environment of a low-risk type. 
 
3.  When collateral consists of non-costly collateral, a large initial ratio of 
collateral to loan capital may attract high-risk borrowers to take loans in order 
to gamble on the appreciation of collateral value. 
 
Consequently; lenders, borrowers and researchers might find it useful to highlight 
the difference between costly and non-costly collateral and pay more attention to 
the variance of collateral value and correlation between collateral value and 
probability of project success. These factors have a strong influence on incentives 
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